Liability for Loss by Fire Among Insurer Tenant and Landlord by Matan, Eugene L.
LIABILITY FOR LOSS BY FIRE AMONG INSURER,
TENANT AND LANDLORD
It is a general practice for a property owner to insure his property
against loss by fire. The insurance company has an equitable right of
subrogation to any cause of action against a third party who negligently
causes loss by fire. When property is leased, the lease quite often contains
a covenant to return the premises in good repair with an exception of
loss by fire. The purpose of this inquiry will be to determine whether
such an exception in a lease coupled with a contemplation that the
lessor will insure the premises, will exonerate the lessee from liability
for any fire loss proximately caused by his own negligence. This presents
a policy issue of current significance as to whether an insurance company,
by exercising its right of subrogation, can shift such risk of loss to
the negligent tenant. Since 1950 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the highest courts of Ohio, North Carolina, Missouri, Illinois, and a
district court in Pennsylvania, have considered this problem. The insur-
ance companies were the real parties in interest and, for the most part,
instigated the litigation.
This comment will include discussions of covenants in a lease,
public policy, the effect of insurance on the liability of the parties, an
analysis of the pertinent cases, Ohio law, and a conclusion. It should
be noted that the following comment will apply only to ordinary negli-
gence on the part of the tenant, and not to wilful or grossly negligent
conduct.
THE TENANT'S LIABILITY
At common law a tenant was not liable for negligent or accidental
loss by fire. By the Statute of Gloucester a lessee for life or years was
made liable for such loss. The law was changed again by 6 Elizabeth
under which a lessee was not liable for accidental loss by fire except
in cases of special agreement.' Therefore, under a lease without any
covenant to repair or to return in good condition, the lessee is only
required to use reasonable diligence in care of the premises2 and is not
liable for loss occasioned by accidental fires; but he is liable if the
property is destroyed through his negligence. 3 If the injury is accidental,
neither landlord nor tenant has the duty to repair in England and the
1 See Warner v. Hitchins, 5 Barb. 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); 1 Thomas's
Lord Coke's First Institute 644; annot. L.R.A. 1918A 369.
2 The tenant is liable for fair and tenant-like repairs which prevent decay
and delapidation, such as keeping buildings wind and water tight, but is not
liable for ordinary wear and tear. Patton v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 279
(W. D. Pa. 1955).
3 United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876) ; Miller v. Miller, 217 Miss.
650, 64 So. 2d 739, 38 A.L.R. 674 (1953); 32 AM. JUR., Landlord and Tenant
§366 at p. 1079 (1947). For a discussion of the cases see 10 A.L.R. 2d 1023 (1950).
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United States; 4 nor, by the better view, would the tenant be liable for
the acts of a stranger.5
The common law duty of reasonable care may be modified by a
geneial covenant to repair or surrender the premises in as good condition
as when received. The unqualified use of this covenant imposes an
absolute obligation to repair or rebuild upon the lessee, irrespective of
th catuse of destruction.
6
To alleviate the extreme harshness of such strict liability to repair
or rebuild, certain specified exceptions are inserted in the lease to relieve
the tenant from liability for injury due to the excepted cause. 7 The
covenant to repair and the exception are generally construed together
so that the covenant is modified by the exception. 8 Where there is an
exception from loss due to ordinary wear and tear, the elements, unavoid-
able casualty, acts of God, or unavoidable accident, the net effect is to
impose a duty of ordinary care on the tenant.' There is a conflict of
authority whether some of these exceptions will include loss caused by
accidental fire and thereby exonerate the lessee.10 The lessee, however,
will not be relieved from liability for a fire negligently caused under
these general exceptions. 1 When "fire" is specifically excepted it is gen-
erally held that loss from accidental fire will fall within the exception
and the lessee will not incur liability for the loss.12 The application
4 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §1967 at p. 5519 (Rev. Ed. 1936). But in civil law
the tenant is not liable for rent and the landlord has the duty to repair since a
lease is looked on as a contract instead of a conveyance. Ibid.
5 RESTATEMENT PROPERTY §146 (1936). Also see 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§20.13 (Casner ed. 1952). Contra, Powell v. Dayton R. Co., 16 Ore. 33, 16 Pac.
863 (1888).
6Anderson v. Ferguson. 17 Wash. 2d 262, 135 P. 2d 302 (1943); Kirby v.
Davis, 210 Ala. 192, 97 So. 655 (1923); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1967 (Rev. Ed.
1936); 32 AM. JUR., Landlord and Tenant §791 at p. 675 (1941); 51 C.J.S.,
Landlord and Tenant §368 at p. 1099 (1947); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§3.79 at p. 349 (Casner ed. 1952).
7 See Brophy v. Fairmont Creamery, 98 Neb. 307, 152 N.W. 557, L.R.A.
1918A 367 (1915). For a collection of cases dealing with this question, see
45 A.L.R. 60 (1926) and 20 A.L.R. 2d 1351 (1951).
8 Miller v. Belnap, 75 Idaho 46, 266 P. 2d 662 (1954).
9 See Ten Six Olive, Inc. v. Curley, 208 F. 2d 117 (8th Cir. 1953). 6
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1967 (Rev. Ed. 1936) note 4; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and
Tenant §368 at p. 1102, §414 at p. 1162 (1947).
10 "Wear and tear" does not include accidental fires. McKinley v. Jutte
and Co., 230 Pa. 122, 79 At]. 244 (1911). "Wear and tear excepted" does not
obligate the tenant to rebuild in case of accidental loss by fire. Howeth v. Ander-
son, 25 Tex. 557, 78 Am. Dec. 538 (1860). Also see 32 AM. JUR., Landlord and
Tenant §811 (1941); 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §368 at p. 1102 (1947).
11 Salina Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Rogers, 171 Kan. 688, 237 P. 2d 218
(1951). "By the elements" includes fire occurring without fault, but not by
negligent acts of a stranger. Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416, 95 Am. Dec. 115
(1868) ; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §368 at 1102 (1947).
12 Basketeria Stores v. Shelton, 199 N.C. 746, 155 S.E. 863 (1930); Hedrick
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of this exception to fires attributable to the lessee's negligence depends
on the intention of the parties to the lease1 3 and there is a conflict of
authority whether the lessee will be exculpated from his own negligence.
The earlier cases construed an exception of "fire" as meaning only
accidental fire, and therefore the lessee was liable for loss due to his
negligence.14 The trend of the more recent cases'3 has been to construe
the lease so that the tenant is exempted from liability for loss resulting
from his own negligence."6 This construction has been primarily attribu-
table to a provision which obligates the lessor to assume the payment
of insurance premiums on the theory the parties intended the lessee to
receive the benefit of the insurance by exculpation.
T
PUBLIC POLICY
The law seems well settled that either ptarty to a lease may exempt
himself from liability for his own negligent acts resulting in injury
to the premises,' 8 and such a construction is not against public policy.'
9
v. Pack, 106 W. Va. 322, 145 S.E. 606 (1928); Kennedy v. Loose Willes Biscuit
Co., 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 602 (1928); Karl v. Jackson, 12 Ohio App. 477 (1920).
13 Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co., 7 Ill. 2d 393, 131 N.E. 2d 100
(1956); Carstens v. Western Pipe and Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 252 Pac. 939
(1927); 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §414 at p. 1162 -(1947).
14 Carstens v. Western Pipe and Steel Co., supra note 13; Brophy v. Fair-
mont Creamery, supra note 7. The lessor was relieved from liability to rebuild
under a covenant to rebuild where the fire was caused by the lessee's negligence.
Morris v. Warner, 207 Cal. 498, 279 P. 152 (1929).
15 With the exception of Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co., 238 N.C.
589, 19 S.E. 2d 185 (1954), discussed in text accompanying note 44, infra.
16 Cf. Lathrop v. Thayer, 138 Mass. 466, 52 Am. Rep. 286 (1885), in which
a tenant at will was held not liable for loss to the leased premises caused by
his negligence since such acts were "permissive waste" and not "voluntary
waste." This exemption did not extend to reckless acts. The reasoning was that
the cost of the risk was included in the rent paid. This decision was discussed
in Gade v. National Creamery Co., 324 Mass. 515, 87 N.E. 2d 180 (1949),
where the court approved Lathrop, "at least in so far as an omission [by the
tenant] to safeguard."
17General Mills, Inc. v. Goldman, 184 F. 2d 359 (Sth Cir. 1950), cert.
denied 340 U.S. 947 (1950), the case is discussed in annot., 20 A.L.R. 2d 1353;
Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. C. A. Snyder, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 812 (W.D.
Pa. 1956), 17 U. PiTT. L. REV. 509 (1956) ; United States Fire Insurance Co. v.
Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E. 2d 330 (1956); Cerny-Pickas & Co.
v. C. I Jahn Co., supra note 13; Kansas City Stock Yard Co. v. A. Reich and
Sons, Inc., 250 S.W. 2d 692 (Mo. 1952), 6 VAND. L. REV. 408 (1952); Slocum v.
Natural Products, 292 Mass. 455, 198 N.E. 747 (1935).
IS See supra note 13. Also 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §368 at p. 1084
(1947).
19 Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co., supra note 13; Jackson v. First
National Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453, 114 N.E. 2d 721 (1953); Checkley
v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 257 Ill. 491, 100 N.E. 942 (1913) ; 6 WILISTON,
CONTRAciS §1751A at p. 4964 (Rev. Ed. 1936). But a contract to exempt a future
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An Illinois appellate court 20 held that a lease with the clause, "loss by
fire and ordinary wear and tear excepted," was void as against public
policy. This case was expressly overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court
which held that the lessee was exculpated from liability by the lease
provision. The court said that this was a private contract and no public
interest was involved, notwithstanding the violation of certain city
ordinances by the lessee. 2 Where the exculpation is in favor of a lessor
and a personal injury is involved, the courts may find "public interest"
and therefore hold the contract void as against public policy.
2 2
There are two opposing rules of construction involved in the cases
where the lease contains an exception of fire. One is that the lease
shall be construed most stringently against the lessor and the other is
that exculpatory contracts are not favored by law and therefore the
lease will be construed stringently against the lessee.23
THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE ON THE LESSEE'S LIABILITY
The insurer can have no more rights than the insured.2 4 Since the
insurer's right depends on subrogation, it may be defeated by the insured's
release prior to or even after loss.23 Therefore the insurer cannot recover
as subrogee where the insured has assumed the risk of loss by fire in a
lease.
26
In the absence of an express or implied provision that the insured
has contracted for the benefit of the lessee or lessor, neither has any
right in insurance procured by the other. Fire insurance is usually con-
sidered a personal contract and does not "run with the land. 2 A
wilful tort or gross negligence is void as against public policy. 6 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS §1751B (Rev. Ed. 1936).
20 Cerny-Pikas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 347 Ill. App. 379, 106 N.E. 2d 828
(1952).
21 Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., supra note 13.
2 2 Papalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941); Conn. v. Manchester
Amusement Co., 79 N.H. 450; 111 Atl. 339 (1920). Contra, Kirschenbaum v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 289 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245, 84 A.L.R. 645
(1932). This case has been abrogated by a New York statute which does not
allow a lessor of an apartment building to exempt himself from liability for
his negligence. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §234; Kean v. 34 West 34th Street Corp.,
190 Misc. 914, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 498 (1947).
23Against the lessor: Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. v. C. A. Snyder, Inc.,
supra note 17. Against exculpatory effect: Carstens v. Western Steel and Pipe Co.,
supra note 13; Dingledly Lumber Co. v. Erie R. Co., 102 Ohio St. 236, 131 N.E.
723 (1921) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§1751B, 1825 (Rev. Ed. 1936) ; 51 C.J.S.,
Landlord and Tenant, §414 (1947). Cf. Freddi-Gail, Inc. v. Royal Holding Corp.,
34 N.J. Super. 142, 111 A. 2d 636 (1955).
24 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 175 U.S. 91 (1899).
25 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Hicklin, 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752 (1909).
26 Frederick v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 207 Wisc. 234, 240 N.. 387,
modified at 241 N.W. 363 (1932).
27Miller v. Gold Beach Packing Co., 131 Ore. 302, 282 Pac. 764, 66 A.L.R.
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tenant bound to rebuild must do so even though the landlord has re-
ceived the insurance money for the loss;2 s nor does the tenant have
any right to the landlord's insurance money upon rebuilding of the
premises.
An attempted assignment by the insured without the consent of the
insurer is inoperative. If the consent of the insured is given then the
assignment becomes a novation, the assignee being substituted for the
original insured. By better opinion such assignee takes such rights as
are given by the terms of the contract, freed from any defenses available
against the assignors."0
THE STATUS OF THE LAW
Brophy v. Fairmont Creamery" held that a covenant in a lease
to yield possession "subject to loss by fire" was intended to relate only to
accidental fires and, accordingly, did not exempt a tenant from liability
for fires caused by his own negligence." A similar result was reached
in Carstens v. Western Pipe and Steel Co." The lessee claimed he was
exculpated by the lease provision "damage by fire or the elements ex-
cepted." The court said that "Such a concession would hardly be looked
for in a contract between business men." It is worthy to note that
neither the Brophy case nor the Carstens case mention an insurance
provision in the lease. This fact is later used to distinguish these two
cases.3
4
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court seemed to have a differ-
ent attitude toward this issue in Slocum v. Natural Products." The court
said that the word "fire," in the clause "damage by fire or unavoidable
casualty excepted," given its ordinary meaning, included fires caused
by the negligence of the tenant.36 This issue was handled very decisively
S58 (1929). Also see cases collected in 29 AM. JUR., Insurance §126, at p. 142,
footnote 11.
2 SPanhandle Oil Co. v. Sherre!, 158 Miss. 810, 131 So. 263 (1930).
29 Ely v. Ely, 80 Ill. 532 (1875).
30American Central Insurance Co. v. Sweetser, 116 Ind. 370, 19 N.E. 159
(1888) ; Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 64 Iowa 507, 20 N.W. 782, (1884);
Fogg v. Middlesex Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 337 (1852). See
generally, VANCE INSURANCE §128 (3d Ed., 1951).
3198 Neb. 307, 152 NAV. 557, L.R.A. 1918A 367 (1915).
3 2AMIERICAN JURISPRUDENCE cites this case as authority for the general rule,
32 AMt. JuR., Landlord and Tenant, §537 at p. 669 (1941).
33 142 Wash, 259, 252 Pac. 939 (1927). Also see 10 A.L.R. 2d 1023 (1950).
The cases are generally to the effect that a lessee of premises is liable in damages
to the lessor for injuries thereto resulting from a fire due to his wrongful act
or negligence.
34 Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., supra note 13.
35 292 Mass. 455, 198 N.E. 747 (1935). This may have been due to the
influence of an earlier case involving a tenant at will, see supra note 16.
36 See annot. 20 A.L.R. 2d 1353 (1951) ; also Brewer, An Inductive Approach
19571
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in the leading case of General Mills v. Goldman." The lease contained
the provision, "loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted," in addition
to a clause which provided that the lessor shall insure the premises
against fire. The premises were destroyed by fire and the insurance
company paid the lessor $110,000, the original purchase price and full
insured value. The lessor sued in district court for negligence and the
insurance company intervened. The trial court found the plaintiff was
damaged to the amount of $142,000.38 The Eighth Court of Appeals
reversed the district court saying that the lease, read as a whole and in
the light of ordinary business practices, exempts the tenant from liability
for negligence. The district court decision stimulated great interest in
the insurance industry. By bringing a subrogation suit against the
negligent lessee the insurance company had a possibility of recouping
unexpected costs which they had computed as part of the risk on the
policy issued to the landlord. Also insurers pondered the prospect of
fire insurance sales to insecure tenants.39 The tenant's dilemma was
great because standard fire insurance policies do not cover property of
others. Most public liability policies exclude liability arising from damage
to the property of others in custody of the insured, and the lack of experi-
ence on the risk made rates pure guesswork.4 ° A notable law review
article 41 concludes that "The insurers . . . will not entirely relinquish
their golden chance." 42
The reaction of insurers seems to have been accurately forecast as
evidenced by the number of cases deciding this issue since the General
Mills case. The Missouri Supreme Court48 cited and followed the
General Mills doctrine, although this case did not involve a lease excep-
tion of fire. The question litigated was the exculpation of the lessee
by an oral agreement to pay a higher rental for the insurance protection.
The only aberration, and case not distinguishable, from the General
Mills doctrine is Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co.4 The lease
provided for return of the premises in good condition, "damage by fire
excepted." There was also a clause that the lessor should insure. The
to the Liability of the Tenant for Negligence, 31 B.U.L. REv. 47 (1951), 339
INS. L. J. 263-73 (1951).
37 184 F. 2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950) ; approved in 35 MINN. L. REv. 603 and
Brewer, supra note 36; disapproved in 12 U. PITT. L. REv. 452 (1951).
38This left a gain of $32,500 by suing, instead of accepting the $110,000 as
determined by the insurer. See Brewer, supra note 36. If this were a subrogation
suit could the insurer realize such an appreciation?
39 See Brewer, supra note 36 at p. 49.
40 Brewer, supra note 36 at p. 51.
41 Brewer, supra note 36.
42 Brewer, supra note 36 at p. 51.
43 Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich and Sons, Inc., 250 S.W. 2d
692 (Mo. 1952), 6 VAND. L. REV. 4,08 (1952).
44 238 N.C. 589, 79 S.E. 2d 185 (1954).
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court held for the lessor, reasoning that the use of an exculpatory
expression of this type in a contract was not plausible in the eyes of a
businessman. The case of Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahrn Company
followed the General Mills doctrine, holding the lessee was exculpated
by the clause "loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted.""5 The Supreme
Court of Ohio also followed the General Mills doctrine in United
States Fire Insurance Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp.46 litigating the clause "loss
by fire and ordinary wear and decay only excepted." Exculpatory effect
was given to a lease in Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. C. A. Snyder,
Inc.) 4 7 applying a lease exception which read "reasonable wear and tear
and accident by fire alone excepted." The district court construed the
word "accident" as applying to fires caused by the lessee's negligence
under Pennsylvania law. Although the court ignored the General Mills
case, this appears to be an expansion of its rationale. The court primarily
used a definitional approach, citing lexicographical authorities saying that
"accident" means any event, occurrence or happening. The court also
"construed the lease most strongly against the lessor."
The courts appear to have made a confusing distinction between
contract and tort liability in some of these cases. Since a lease exception
exculpating the lessee is not against public policy, there is no reason for
such a distinction except as an aid in determining the intent of the
parties. It seems clear that a lessee may modify tort liability for negli-
gence by a contract. An Ohio Supreme Court case, Day Wood Heel
Co. v. Rover,"8 may have drawn this distinction between tort and contract
liability. In that case the lessor brought two separate actions, one for
negligence and one on the lease. The decision concerned only the suit
on the lease for breach of covenant to return the premises in good
condition. The opinion expressly states the case will be confined to the
alleged breach of covenant "without prejudice to rights of the parties
in the action ex delicto pending in the court below." 4 9 The tort action
appears never to have been reported. This dictum may be interpreted as
indicating that there was possibly a cause of action in tort distinct from
45 Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 7 Ii .2d 393, 131 N.E. 2d 100
1956); 44 ILL. B. J. 574. (1956). The majority opinion advanced the following
arguments for exemption: (1) The lease clearly contemplates loss by fire. (2)
Construed with the clause providing that the landlord shall insure the building
against loss by fire it is very likely the word "fire" was used to include fires
caused by negligence since this is the definition used in a standard fire insurance
policy. (3) Construed against the common law background the exception would
have no meaning at all unless it were intended to exempt the lessee. (4) The
cost of insurance is actually being paid by the lessee in a higher rental.
46 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E. 2d 330 (1956).
47137 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa. 1956), disapproved, 17 U. Pirr. L. REv. 509
(1956).
48 123 Ohio St. 349, 175 N.E. 588, 20 A.L.R. 3d 1353 (1931).
4 9 1d. at 351, 175 N.E. at 589.
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any contractual liability, notwithstanding an intent by the parties to
modify tort liability. The other possible interpretation of the dictum
is that the court was adhering to the principle of confining the decision
to the matters before it, i.e. an action on the contract.
The Slocum case5" also indicates that there is a difference between
a tort and a contract obligation. The Massachusetts court held that the
lessee was exculpated from any contractual duty by a lease exception
of fire but qualified this with a dictum, "It does not necessarily follow
that the lessor would have no action in tort."
Judge Sanborn in his dissenting opinion to the General Mills case51
uses the delineation between tort and contract in finding the parties'
intent. He implies that a contract may modify tort liability but that
the parties only intended to modify contractual liability to rebuild where
the fire was accidental and not to modify liability for negligence. He
said that a tenant's tort liability for negligence is quite apart from his
contractual liability to pay rent or make repairs and the exceptions do
not exonerate the tenant from tort liability, even though the damage
is due to one of the excepted causes. The majority opinion does not
recognize this delineation between tort and contract and allows the
contract to have exculpatory effect. The dissent in the Cerny-Pickas
case asserts that "such exceptions are not designed to relieve the lessee
from tort liability." The majority opinion soundly rejects this schism in
the parties' thinking, saying, "There are areas of the law in which the
distinctions between liability in contract and in tort may be significant,
despite their remote and accidental origin. We are not satisfied, however,
that such distinctions are relevant in determining the meaning to be
given to words used by laymen in defining their rights and obligations."5' 2
OHIo LAw
The exception of fire clause has had varied interpretation in Ohio.
An exception, to an express covenant to return the premises in good
condition, of "damage by fire or other unavoidable casualty excepted,"
did not include the leaving of debris on the premises after a fire and the
tenant was liable for the cost of removal." In Day Wood Heel Co. v.
Rover," the lessor sued for breach of covenant to return the premises
in good condition, "damage by fire or other unavoidable casualty ex-
cepted." The lessor made his case depend on an interpretation of the
clause as reading "unavoidable fire." The court held this construction
5OSupra note 35.
51 General Mills, Inc. v. Goldman, supra note 37 at p. 370-71.
52 Supra note 45.
5 Kenton Baking Powder Co. v. Harrison, 1 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 245, 14 Ohio
Dec. 43 (1903).
" Supra note 48.
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would have the effect of making the lessee the insurer and he would
not be liable if the lessor merely proved the fire was avoidable.
An appellate court case, m in which the lease clause read "damage
by fire and other unavoidable casualty excepted," held that the tenant
would not be liable for damage caused by fire unless it appears he was
negligent. The dictum in this case indicates the lessee may have been
liable if he were negligent but, of course, there was no issue of exempt-
ing the lessee from negligence.
The Ohio Supreme Court in United States Fire Insurance Com-
pany v. Phil-Mar Corp." decisively held that a lease which contained
an exception to the surrender clause of "loss by fire," completely exon-
erated the lessee from liability for loss due to his own negligence. The
court reasoned that the exception clause and the clause which provided
that the lessor insure, indicated intention by the parties to exculpate the
lessee from loss caused by his own negligent acts as well as loss from
fires caused by accident.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The trend of the law is definitely to construe the exception of fire
clauses as an exculpatory provision, relieving the lessee from liability
for his own negligence. The two opposing rules of construction, con-
struing a lease most strictly against the lessor, or most strictly against
an exculpatory contract, have merely been used by the courts as a make-
weight factor in support of their particular conclusions. The two
essential elements to the exculpatory construction are: (1) the existence
of an exception of loss by fire and (2) the existence of fire insurance
on the premises paid for by the lessor.
57
The courts' only technique of ascertaining the intent of the parties
is to consider extrinsic evidence and construe the language used in the
lease against the local common law background. Lease exemptions of
liability for fire loss through negligence are not against public policy
since both parties are ordinarily free to bargain for their desired terms.
Therefore the courts can only receive their mandate from the parties
and should not substitute judicial for private legislation. The C. Z.
Snyder case appears to be an unjustified extention of inferential effect
given to the existence of insurance 5 paid for by the lessor resulting in
5 Karl v. Jackson, 12 Ohio App. 477 (1920); 24- OHIO JUR., Landlord and
Tenant §253 at p. 1000.
O6Supra note 46.
O 7The Supreme Court of Texas refused to allow the lessee to be exempted
from liability for his own negligence under the lease provision, "Lessor agrees
to carry his own insurance against loss by fire, etc., on the entire building". The
sole contention was based on the existence of this insurance clause and there was
no clause excepting fire from operation of the lease. Wichita City Lines Inc. v.
Puckett, 295 S.W. 2d 894 (Tex. 1956).
G8As previously pointed out, this does not appear to be the main reliance
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alleviating the hardship on the uninsured lessee. It is extremely difficult
to see how the lease exception of "accident by fire" could reasonably
be thought of by the parties as excepting fire caused by the lessee's
negligence.
The trend of the recent cases, exempting the lessee where there
is an ordinary "loss by fire" exception, is certainly desirable as the
opinions utilize a reasonable interpretation of the intent of the parties.
It is significant to note that all the cases exempting the lessee from
liability have involved an industrial lessee. From a practical business point
of view it is not likely that a manufacturing concern would intend only
to protect itself from aaccidcntal loss and not loss due to its own negli-
gence. Where it is clear that the parties contemplate insurance to be paid
for by the lessor it is logical to conclude that they intend the lessee to
pay for the insurance through rent payment. It would be an undue
hardship to require a tenant to insure against his own negligence where
he is paying for the fire insurance which covers the premises in favor
of the lessor. The lessee should not be treated as a negligent third party
subject to subrogation rights, but should have the benefit of the insurance
policy. Such a policy contemplates a potentially negligent occupant and
a right of subrogation would be a windfall to the insurer. It would be
very difficult for the tenant to procure an insurance policy since the
standard fire insurance policy doesn't cover property of others and
therefore there is little risk experience. Even assuming the tenant could
procure such an insurance policy to cover the premises there would be
some overlap of coverage between the tenant's and the lessor's policies.
Since the lessee is concededly not bound under the lease for fires occurring
through accident, in order to eliminate insuring the same risk twice his
policy could cover only the narrow situation where he is negligently
instrumental in damaging the premises by fire. Is such a policy feasible?
If a policy covers loss by the negligence of the insured, it would
ordinarily cover loss without his fault. There certainly can be no risk
experience to cover so narrow a field. Rates actually would amount to
a re-insuring by the lessee of the risk already covered by the lessor's
policy, resulting in a double profit for the insurer. Would an insurance
company reduce its premium on the lessor's policy in a case where it does
have a right of subrogation against a lessee? It does not seem very
likely; and even if it did the computation of a reduction would be
arbitrary speculation.
There is a peripheral area deserving of mention. A recent Texas
case59 rejected an attempted assertion that the exxistence of insurance
paid for by the lessor would be enough to exculpate the lessee, without
of the court, but it is the only logical explanation for such a construction. The
use of the word "accident" seems to negative the construction given by the court.
59 Wichita City Lines, Inc. v. Puckett, supra note 57.
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an exception of fire. There should be no objection to this exculpation as
long as the intent of the parties can be determined from the lease and
the evidence. However, since there is no lease exception of fire, this is a
more remote area and the courts will be more cautious in relieving
the tenant from liability.
There is an additional factor, apparently not considered in the
cases, which may influence the construction of a lease whiich excepts
"loss by fire." An insurance company may avoid a policy for breach
of warranty if the premises are burdened by an additional risk without
its consent and also if the exoneration of the lessee is considered in
derogation of its subrogation rights., If we assume the parties know this,
then it would be a reasonable inference that they contemplate notification
to the insurer of a change in occupants and terms of the lease. The
absence of a notification to the insurer might result in a complete shift
of the burden of risk to the lessor. This is certainly not intended by
the parties, as evidenced by the very existence of an insurance policy.
Notification, therefore, may be an important indication of whether the
parties intended the lease to have an exculpatory effect.
The most satisfactory solution is to draft the lease in such lucid
terms that there will be no doubt as to who is to bear the burden of
loss by fire due to the lessee's negligence: the lessee, lessor, or insurer.
Eugene L. Matan
19571
